

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

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USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

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P R 171931Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2831

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4473

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR : REVIEW PROVISION IN TEXT OF NAC GUIDANCE FOR
AD HOC GROUP

REF: (A) USNATO 2639; (B) STATE 103044

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE ARE PLEASED THAT IT HAS BEEN
POSSIBLE FOR NAC TO SEND TIMELY AND USEFUL GUIDANCE
FOR THE AD HOC GROUP, BUT WE AGREE WITH WASHINGTON
DESIRE TO REOPEN SECTION V OF NAC GUIDANCE IN
REF (A). PRESENT FORMULATION CREATES DIFFICULTIES FOR
US ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE THAT USNATO MADE THE BEST OF SITUATION.
THE PROBLEM WE FACE IS TO MEET IN SOME WAY THE SOVIET
CONCERN-- WHICH IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE DROPPED -- THAT
IF PHASE II FAILS, SOVIET FORCES WOULD HAVE BEEN

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REDUCED WHILE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD NOT.

HENCE, WE RECOMMEND ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING PHRASE TO THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE GUIDANCE: "-- THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS COULD WITHDRAW FOLLOWING REVIEW." AD HOC GROUP MEMBERS HERE GENERALLY AGREED WITH NEED TO MODIFY PRESENT FORMULA. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESENT FORMULATION OF PARA V OF NAC GUIDANCE DOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION WITH EAST AS REGARDS PHASING. PROBLEM WE FACE IS TO HAVE SOME WAY OF MEETING THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT, IN EVENT OF EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIES' PHASE I PROGRAM, THE USSR AND THE EAST GENERALLY MIGHT BE PLACED AT LASTING DISADVANTAGE IN EVENT PHASE II HAS NO OUTCOME. USSR WOULD HAVE ENTERED ON PHASE I AGREEMENT IN THE EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A PHASE II AGREEMENT IN WHICH EUROPEAN FORCES INCLUDING THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE REDUCED, THUS MEETING A MAJOR EASTERN INTEREST IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS FAILED TO HAVE AN OUTCOME, THIS EXPECTATION WOULD HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED. IN THIS SENSE, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT A MAJOR DEFECT OF THE ALLIED PHASING APPROACH WAS THAT IT GAVE THEM NO ASSURANCE WHATEVER THAT THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE AN ACTUAL OUTCOME. THERE APPEARS NO CHANCE THAT THE EAST WILL DROP THIS CRITICISIM AS LONG AS PHASING UNDER DISCUSSION. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES AGAIN RAISED IT AS A MAJOR SHORT-COMING OF THE ALLIED APPROACH IN THE INFORMAL SESSION WHICH TOOK PLACE ON MAY 15 AND THEY HAVE RAISED IT IN EVERY PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF PHASING.

3. THE ALLIES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE SOVIETS GUARANTEES AS TO THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, NOR DO THEY WISH TO DO SO. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE WOULD BE TO CONVERT PHASE II FROM A SEPARATE PHASE OF NEGOTIATION TO A SEPARATE PHASE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND TO DECIDE ON ALL REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET IN A SINGLE PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, THE PROBLEM MUST BE MET IF THE ALLIES ARE TO SUCCEED IN GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO PHASING

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AND THUS TO POSTPONING WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. IN LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION, US HAS SUGGESTED THAT AN ACCEPTABLE WAY TO DEL WITH THE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO INCLUDE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT A PROVISION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE USSR TO WITHDRAW FROM THE AGREEMENT.

4. THE PRESENT FORMULATION OF PARA V PROVIDING FOR

A REVIEW AFTER FIVE YEARS IS INADEQUATE. THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE EAST ON HEARING THE PRESENT FORMULATION WILL BE, "WHAT CONSEQUENCES WOULD THE REVIEW HAVE?" THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA MUST HAVE READY THE ANSWER TO THIS OBVIOUS QUESTION OR LOSE CREDIBILITY AS SERIOUS NEGOTIATORS. MOREOVER, ONLY REASONABLE ANSWER WHICH CAN BE GIVEN, EARLIER OR LATER IS THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE THE NEXT STEP. HENCE, WE RECOMMEND SUPPLEMENTING PRESENT GUIDANCE BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING PHRASE TO THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE PRESENT GUIDANCE. "-- THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS COULD WITHDRAW FOLLOWING REVIEW." COMMENT: OUR FORMULATION REFERS ONLY TO THE SOVIETS SINCE THE ALLIES HAVE NOT YET DECIDED ISSUE OF WHO SHOULD BE SIGNATORIES OF PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THIS ISSUE WOULD IN ANY EVENT NOT HAVE TO BE FACED IN CONTEXT OF REVIEW AND WITHDRAWAL UNTIL LATER STAGE OF SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS. END COMMENT.

5. THE FURTHER RATIONALE FOR OUR RECOMMENDATION IS:

A. EASTERN OBJECTIONS ON THIS POINT ARE NOT ONLY MOST UNLIKELY TO BE DROPPED. THEY HAVE SOME OBJECTIVE VALIDITY IN THAT THEY POINT TO A POTENTIALLY REAL PROBLEM.
B. A POSSIBLE PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL OR TERMINATION AFTER A FIXED PERIOD APPEARS THE LEAST UNDESIRABLE WAY TO MEET THIS CONCERN. THE ONLY APPARENT ALTERNATIVES

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FROM US REP MBFR

ARE TO DECIDE ON EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET, OR TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO DELAY SOME PORTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WITHDRAWALS UNTIL THEY ARE ABLE TO ASSURE THEMSELVES THAT PHASE II WILL HAVE AN OUTCOME SATISFACTORY TO THEM. THE RESULT OF THE LATTER COURSE WOULD BE AN UNCLEAR SITUATION IN WHICH IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE US WOULD BE OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES WHILE THE DEGREE AND EXTENT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS COULD BECOME AN OBJECT OF CONTENTION AND DISPUTE.

C. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES COULD GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO LIMIT A WESTERN NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT AS REGARDS DURATION, A LIMITATION WHICH IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR ALLIED INTERESTS, WITHOUT THE SOVIETS REQUIRING THAT THE MAIN AGREEMENT BINDING THEM ALSO BE LIMITED TO THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME. THEY
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WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS INEQUITABLE TO PLACE THEM UNDER A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA OF LONGER DURATION THAN THE PARALLEL COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN BY NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES.

D. WE DO NOT FIND CONVINCING THE ARGUMENT THAT, IF WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE IS INCLUDED IN PHASE I AGREEMENT, SOVIETS COULD USE A THREAT TO WITHDRAW TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ALLIES DURING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARGUMENT IS APPARENTLY THAT, IF THE SOVIETS DID WITHDRAW, THEY WOULD BE IN BETTER POSITION THAN US TO REINTRODUCE THEIR WITHDRAWN FORCES INTO THE AREA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF THIS THREAT. THEY WOULD STILL BE MOVED TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE WAY TO SECURE DURABLE CEILING ON WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES AND EUROPEAN FORCE REDUCTIONS, WHICH AS NOTED IN THEIR STRONGEST SINGLE INTEREST IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, A CLAUSE OF THIS KIND WOULD HAVE NO AUTOMATICITY AND WOULD PLACE THE ONUS ON THE SOVIETS TO INITIATE THE ACTION LEADING TO WITHDRAWAL. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, IF SOVIETS SHOULD INVOKE CLAUSE, FROM

ALLIED VIEWPOINT, WEST WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF PHASE I AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE, US FORCES WITHDRAWN AND SOVIETS THEN TERMINATED THAN IN CASE OF UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT AGREEMENT.

F. WE WOULD THINK THAT THOSE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF MBFR FOR THEM WOULD HAVE POSITIVE VIEW OF WITHDRAWAL PROVISION WHICH WOULD PERMIT TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT BY WEST IF SOVIETS WERE WHOLLY UNCOOPERATIVE IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS OR IF SOVIET POLICY TOOK ADVERSE TURN WITHIN NEXT FIVE YEARS.

6. DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN AD HOC GROUP GENERALLY SHARE VIEWS SET FORTH ABOVE. NETHERLANDS REP IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO PRESENT WORDING AND HAS SAID HE WILL INTERVENE WITH HIS AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE AMENDMENT WE RECOMMEND. CANADIAN REP REPORTS HIS AUTHORITIES ARE DISSATISFIED WITH OUTCOME AND WOULD SUPPORT RE-OPENING. UK AND FRG REPS HAVE ALSO

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SAID THEY SHARE OUR GENERAL LINE OF REASONING. BELGIAN REP, WHO CLAIMS TO BE ORIGINATOR OF BELGIAN OPPOSITION TO WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE, HAS TOLD US HE RECOGNIZES FORCE OF ARGUMENTS WE HAVE ADVANCED BUT HAS NOT MADE UP HIS MIND FINALLY WHICH WAY HE SHOULD GO FROM HERE. HUMES

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